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This paper combines perspectives of business strategy and political science scholars 
to study the costs, benefits and potential long-term effects of building business 
government relation. Drawing on resource dependence theory and power 
dependence theory, I develop hypotheses on how firms build business-government 
relation through providing a stable economy, for example hiring more employees 
than needed and keeping tax revenues high, and how business government 
relation helps firms to deal with government officials easier and can, in turn, pay 
less bribes and enjoy lower operating costs. This paper also looks at the impact of 
business government relation on firm’s subsequent investment and divestment 
behaviors. The hypotheses are tested by firm-level data in 25 transition economies. 
Empirical results show that firms reporting more tax and hire more unnecessary 
employees have stronger relation with government, i.e. are more capable in 
influencing policies and regulations related to their businesses. Firms with strong 
relation with government pay less bribery to government officials to get things 
done and to secure government contracts. Moreover, firms with strong relation 
with government are less likely to alter their production mix, which implies they are 
less likely to involve in innovations and new investment. Therefore, when building 
and maintaining business-government relation, firms should ensure that they can 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been widely accepted that firms receive economic benefit through 
building and maintaining a good relationship with their governments (Bertrand, 
Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2004; Faccio, 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Li, Meng, 
Wang, & Zhou, 2008). Previous research suggests that business-government 
relations help firms in various ways: securing of favorable regulatory conditions 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001) and access to resources, such as bank loans (Faccio, 
2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Yet few studies look into how business-government 
relations influence firms’ future development. In this study, I will look into the costs 
of and benefits from building business-government relations with incumbent 
politicians and bureaucrats, and then I will analyze whether and how business-
government relations influence firms’ decisions on future development.  
In studying business-government relations, business strategy scholars 
mainly talk about why business-government relations are important, what benefits 
firms can extract from them, and through what mechanisms these benefits can be 
obtained. Concerning costs of building government relations, business strategy 
scholars mostly limit themselves to activities that are easily visible and directly 
pointing to political connection building, such as social activities (drinking and 
dining) and bribery activities, and these activities mostly contribute to the receivers’ 
personal pocket. Political science researchers on the other hand suggest that 
incumbent politicians expect something else from businessmen. One thing that 
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politicians want and businessmen can give is economic stability since it can help 
politicians to extend their tenure. To achieve optimum cost-effective operation and 
maximize profits, it is usual for firms to avoid redundant head counts and use 
strategic accounting to minimize tax payable. In order to maintain economic 
stability, firms can help reduce unemployment rates through excessive hiring and 
increase government income through paying more tax by reducing the amount of 
strategic accounting. By doing so, firms build stronger relationships with incumbent 
politicians and bureaucrats and thus become more powerful in influencing changes 
to laws and regulations that may have an important impact on their businesses.  
This phenomenon is more apparent in transition economies since these 
countries undergo a series of changes and their governments target economic 
growth, thus providing more opportunities for firms and government officials to 
engage in exchange behavior. Hence, the transition process makes business-
government relations an important topic in transition economies. Moreover, as 
transition economies have become more and more important in the global market 
and gain a lot of investor attention from all over the world, it is important to 
understand how the business-government relationship functions in these fast 
growing economies and understand how such relation influences firms’ behavior 
and development in the long run.  
Linking discussions on business-government relations from a business 
strategy perspective and political science perspective, this paper reveals some 
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government relation building costs that business scholars have long ignored and 
discusses, besides being able to influence government policies and regulations, 
some potential benefits that government relations can offer firms. The ultimate 
goal of this paper is to highlight the influence of business-government relations on 
firm behavior rather than only focus on the immediate economic or financial 
outcomes as in previous research. Understanding whether and how business-
government relations impact firm behavior and its subsequent development can 
generate better knowledge of the long-term effect of such relations and lead to the 
discussion of whether and when business-government relations are worth building.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 will review the 
background and literature review on transition economies and business-
government relations. Based on the literature review in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 will 
develop several testable hypotheses on the topic of interest. In Chapter 4, I will 
present the methodology of the study. Chapter 5 reports the results of empirical 
analysis. Finally, in Chapter 6, I will discuss the findings, limitations and future 
research direction, and conclude the paper.  
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section will provide definitions, background and previous research 
relevant to business-government relations and transition economies. By reviewing 
these studies, this section will highlight the importance of studying business-
government relations in transition markets and how business-government relations 
impact firm behavior in the long run. In this section, I will begin with the definition 
and process of transition economies and then discuss the roles of government in 
transition economies. Then, I will discuss the purposes of building business-
government relations and how such relations are built. Finally, I will discuss how 
this paper is different from previous research studying business-government 
relations and highlight the potential contributions of this paper. 
2.1 Transition Economies 
2.1.1 Countries in Transition 
 A transition economy is one that is transforming from a centrally planned 
economy to market economy. While researchers studying transition economies 
always focus on countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union, the term “transition economies” indeed has a broader meaning than this. 
Countries which are outside Europe and transforming from a socialist-type 
command economy to a market-based economy, for example China, are also 
members of transition economies. In a study published in 2000, the International 
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Monetary Fund lists 29 countries as transition economies in four regional 
categories (see Table 1) (IMF, 2000).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
--------------------------------- 
 
In 2002, the World Bank added Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia and 
Montenegro to the transition economies list (WorldBank, 2002a). Every now and 
then, IMF, the World Bank and some other economic monitoring organizations add 
and drop countries into and from the transition economies country list according to 
their economic environmental characteristics. Thus, before going into the study, we 
need to understand the process of market economy transformation and the roles 
of government in this process.  
2.1.2 Process of Economy Transition 
Based on Fischer and Gelb (1991), the IMF (2000) summarizes the following as 
components of the transition process: Liberalization, Macroeconomic stabilization, 
Restructuring and privatization, and Legal and institutional reforms. Liberalization 
refers to the transformation from controlled markets to free markets. This process 
includes allowing markets to determine most of the prices and lowering trade 
barriers that would inhibit contact with the price structure of the world’s market 
economies.  
Market liberalization opens up originally sealed markets and encourages 
investments from both domestic and world markets. The sudden increase in 
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investment creates an inflation surge (Ghosh, 1997); thus governments need to be 
disciplined over budget as well as fiscal and monetary policies in order to contain 
the inflation rate and this process is Macroeconomic stabilization (Debrun and 
Kapoor, 2010).  
Restructuring and privatization refer to the processes of establishing 
feasible financial institutions and reforming the enterprises in these economies 
such that the ownership of these enterprises can be transferred into private hands. 
Finally, these countries need to undergo legal and institutional reforms in order to 
redefine the role of the state in these economies, formulate laws and regulations, 
and introduce appropriate competition policies to achieve natural market 
efficiency. 
2.1.3 The Role of Government in Transition Economies 
While in the developed world, economists expect governments to take a 
limited role and allow the market to operate itself, countries which are in market 
economy transformation cannot take a similar approach as their more developed 
counterparts. In his paper based on the case of China, one of the large transition 
economies, Liou (1998) summarizes five major roles of government in the process 
of economic development: protector of citizen, distributor of income, manager of 
economy and business, regulator of industry, and promoter of growth.  
As protectors, governments need public policies to protect citizens and 
businesses from hostile social unrest, hostile international relations and illegitimate 
7 
 
political appropriation. Only by doing so, can governments provide a peaceful and 
stable domestic environment for businesses to operate in and for the economy to 
grow. As distributors, governments need to balance classes and regional income 
inequality and to redistribute through formulating and implementing social welfare 
policies and initiating development projects in rural areas where its residents 
usually have relatively low incomes compared to people living in the urban area. A 
stable economic environment is a crucial factor for economic growth. To assure a 
safe and stable economic environment, governments need to adjust monetary 
policy and fiscal policy in order to minimize both the unemployment rate and 
inflation rate as a high unemployment rate creates burden for social welfare 
systems and a high inflation rate deters investment. In economic transition 
countries, private property rights are usually not protected. During the process of 
transition, governments begin to formulate and test rules and regulations to create 
an environment in which business can operate and individuals’ rights are 
sufficiently protected. The final role of governments in transition economies is to 
act as promoters of economic growth and social development. To promote 
economic growth, governments need to implement public policies to invest in 
public infrastructure and to promote the development of business sectors in both 
domestic and international markets. 
2.2 Purposes of Business-Government Relations 
For the five government roles mentioned above, three of them are related 
to this study, they are manager of economy and business, regulator of industry, 
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and promoter of growth. The manager role explains why policy-making politicians 
want to build cooperative relationships with firms and the other two explain why 
firms want to establish relations with those politicians. 
Business-government relations are a form of benefit exchange, and both 
firms and politicians are involved in such exchange for some reasons. There are 
several reasons for policy-making politicians to establish relationships with 
particular firms. Corruption in terms of bribery, i.e. benefits that go right into 
politicians’ personal pocket, is an obvious but illegal reason and mechanism why 
and how politicians are involved in personal business-government relations (UNDP, 
2003). In this study, however, corruption involving high-level officials is not the 
major focus; instead, this study will look at how the economy manager role of 
transition economy governments drives their high-level officials to establish 
business-government relations with firms.  
Since people, investors and the rest of the world use economic 
development as one of the important benchmarks to evaluate the achievement of 
a government, an incumbent government, especially one that targets economic 
transformation and rapid growth, would therefore attempt to fulfill the roles 
proposed by Liou (1998). Tenure and promotion of policy-making government 
officials and politicians are highly associated with economic growth. In countries 
with voting systems, it is obvious to expect citizens to favor the incumbent 
government when the economy is booming and this explains why government 
officials care about the economic environment. Unexpectedly, for countries 
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without voting systems, even countries with only one political party, such as China, 
the story is more or less the same. In China for example, the Central government 
formulates national economic growth targets every year and distributes the target 
down to the provincial level and so on. Therefore, each province, each town and 
each regional industry has its own yearly target. At the end of each year, provincial, 
township and regional industrial leaders’ achievements are evaluated against the 
targets. In about every five years, the Central government evaluates these leaders’ 
overall performance and decides whether they should stay, get promotion or be 
kicked out of the game. Guo’s (2009) study finds evidence that Chinese regional 
leaders do respond to the performance evaluation by stimulating economic growth 
through increasing public expenditure. 
Mr. Vito Tanzi, Director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, comments 
that “the transformation to a market economy is not complete until functioning 
fiscal institutions and reasonable and affordable expenditure programs, including 
basic social safety nets for the unemployed, the sick, and the elderly, are in place. 
Spending programs must be financed from public revenues generated—through 
taxation—without imposing excessive burdens on the private sector” (Tanzi, 1999). 
Thus, the level of tax revenue is another indicator of government officials’ 
performance.  
To achieve outstanding performance in growth and successfully transform 
the economy, governments need firms to hire, invest and pay tax. As firms 
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continue to hire and invest, the unemployment rate goes down and government 
income, i.e. tax revenue, increases, and, in turn, regional leaders’ appraisal scores 
go up. Thus, tenure extension and promotion can be expected.  
 When transforming from socialist economies to market economies, 
countries go through a long experimenting process to see how the market works 
best and how to stimulate the economy to grow faster. During such process, there 
are a lot of regulations and deregulations, and governments formulate various sets 
of economy boosting policies. Thus, this process provides a good opportunity for 
firms to influence their governments to formulate regulations and policies that are 
favorable for their businesses to operate in.  
2.3 Comparison with Previous Studies 
In business and economic fields, scholars studying business-government 
relations mostly start from firms’ perspective. Thus, this line of study pays more 
attention to what firms can get from the relation while putting less effort into 
understanding what firms need to pay in return (Frye, 2002). Previous research has 
found that building relationships with government can help firms to create a 
favorable business environment (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001) and to access 
resources such as bank loans (Faccio, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). Li and his 
colleagues (2008) explored whether political affiliation can help firm owners in 
China to borrow more money from banks and they found a positive relationship 
between the two.  
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In terms of what firms need to pay in order to build government relations, 
business scholars mainly focus on various forms of corruption, such as gifts, bribery 
or entertainment expenses (Cai, Fang & Yu, 2005). In the political science field, 
scholars do explore other ways that firms can use to build relationships with top-
level officials; however, this line of study focuses on the behavior of the firms and 
its influence on politicians while paying less attention to what happens to firms 
afterwards (Bertrand et al., 2004; Gehlbach, 2006). This paper combines the two 
perspectives, business strategy and political science, and attempts to explore the 
relationship between firms’ contribution to economic development and firms’ 




CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In advancing the study of business-government relations at firm level, a 
number of research questions can be asked: 1) what does it take for firms to build 
relations with governments, in particular incumbent politicians and top-level, 
policy-making bureaucrats? 2) What benefits can firms get besides being able to 
influence regulations and policies which concern them? And 3) what are the 
consequences in the long run; in particular whether and how business-government 
relations influence firm behavior and development? In this part, we will look at 
these three questions and develop related hypotheses. 
3.1 Building Relationships with Policy-Making Politicians  
 
Many business strategy scholars use resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003) to explain the business-government relationship and discuss various 
ways used by firms to manage this relationship. According to this perspective, all 
organizations, including business firms situated in an open system, are dependent 
on external resources for survival and growth. Government is definitely one of the 
most important sources of external resources in transition economies. Due to the 
“institutional voids” prevailing in the transition economies, which are characterized 
by the absence of well-developed regulatory systems and the dearth of well-
functioning contract-enforcing mechanisms and intermediaries in product, labor 
and capital markets (Khanna, Palepu, & Sinha, 2005), government agencies control 
more resources and discretionary power and create more uncertainties for 
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business activities than their developed economy counterparts. When the 
institutional environment is less predictable, business-government relations help 
firms to cope with policy changes and even allows firms to influence such changes 
to favor their operations (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001). Therefore, business-
government relations, or political connections, are very important in transition 
markets. Scholars studying business-government relations from the business 
perspective always emphasize what firms can extract from such relations while 
paying less attention to what firms need to pay in return; however, firms do not 
receive benefits from government without paying anything back (Frye, 2002). Even 
if some scholars try to delineate the costs of building government relations, topics 
are mainly limited to visible ones, such as bribery and entertainment expenses.  
Although resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) highlights 
a mutual dependency relationship, most business strategy scholars take it as a one-
way relationship by only looking at what firms can get from government but 
ignoring what resources governments depend on that can be provided by business 
entities. From evidence around the world, it is clear that business-government 
relations are a form of “exchange” between firms and politicians. In such exchange, 
economic rewards are transferred to firms and then firms offer politicians with 
politically-valuable services in return. One thing that government or incumbent 
politicians want and the business sector can give is economic stability (Quinn & 
Woolley, 2001). Economic stability is crucial to a government because it is highly 
related to tenure of incumbent politicians who are running the government right 
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now. For instance, the Pro-Russian party, a political party that is believed to be 
unpopular in Latvia, a country which is trying to distance itself from its communist 
past subsequent to its independence from Russia, wins Latvian elections because 
the previous government did not do well when it faced a financial crisis (Buehrer, 
2011). Bertrand et al. (2004) find that business leaders from politically connected 
firms in France create more jobs to build “re-election favors” for incumbent 
politicians. 
Other than that, politicians also expect a certain form of financial support 
from politically connected firms, such as political contribution or tax revenue. In 
the 1990s, politically connected Russian businesses were more likely to be subject 
to price controls and more frequent inspections because it was beneficial to 
politicians (Frye, 2002). Not just politicians require payback from firms, but firms 
are willing to give as well. According to Gehlbach’s (2006) study on the tax 
compliance of firms in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, firms hide 
revenue from tax authorities is associate with the firm-level satisfaction with state-
provided goods and services. Since larger and politically connected firms receive 
better service from the government, they are less willing to hide revenue, i.e. they 
are willing to pay more tax. 
Firms help politicians to stay in power through excessive hiring and pay 
more tax and, thus, enjoy the privilege of being influential over government 
policies and regulations that they are interested in. More contribution from the 
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focal firm, i.e. spending more on maintaining a stable economy, would therefore 
lead to a stronger relationship with incumbent politicians and bureaucrats, i.e. 
higher level of influential power.  
H1: The more firms contribute to the national economy (from a 
government perspective), the stronger business-government 
relations they are likely to have. 
3.2 Dealing with Government Officials 
In China, firms with political connections enjoy higher bank loans, have 
access to more capital sources and can borrow capital cheaper when compared 
with their non-connected counterparts (Li et al., 2008). Pakistan shows the same 
evidence (Khwaja & Mian, 2005). The difference in access to capital is due to the 
lending practice of state-owned banks and this difference increases as business-
government relations grow stronger (Brandt & Li, 2003; Che, 2002). A cross-
national study shows that firms with controlling shareholders or top managers who 
are members of legislatures or national governments enjoy easier access to debt 
financing and lower taxation (Faccio, 2006). Thus, firms which do not have such 
political connections might need to bribe their way out.  
In transition countries where institutions are absent and government 
operating procedures are not so transparent, government officials can easily get in 
the way of business operations as they virtually have full control of licensing and 
government contract bidding. For politicians and top-level bureaucrats who are 
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already benefiting from firms’ contribution in lowering the unemployment rate and 
increasing tax revenue, they cannot be too aggressive when taking personal 
financial benefits from these firms since they may risk losing support from these 
firms.  For lower-level government officials whose tenure and promotion are less 
related to economic environment, they are more likely to seek personal benefits, 
i.e. bribes, from firms when firms are looking up to them for all kinds of licensing 
and government contract bidding. As there are few institutions or monitoring 
mechanisms in transition countries to monitor operating government officials, the 
relationship between these officials and business firms is particularly imbalanced. 
To balance an imbalanced dyadic relation, we can introduce an additional actor as 
any two actors in a triadic relation can form a coalition to act against the third actor 
(Emerson, 1962). Therefore, firms may build good relationships with politicians and 
top-level bureaucrats who make decisions on policy changes and, more importantly, 
“rule” the low-level government officials who implement policies and procedures. 
Since policy-making politicians usually are supervisors of lower-level operating 
government officials, firms having strong relations with these politicians have 
relatively stronger bargaining power than firms which do not have such relations 
when dealing with low-level government officials. For the above reasons, firms 
which contribute more and have stronger relations with government may be able 
to pay lower bribes to government officials and have higher priority in the line 
when waiting for some administrative work to be done. Therefore, I hypothesize 
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that firms with stronger business-government relations are likely to have lower 
costs in dealing with government officials. 
H2: The stronger business-government relation firms have, the 
lower the costs they need to pay when dealing with government 
officials. 
3.3 Influence of Business-Government Relations 
 
In previous sections, we discussed how firms build and maintain relations 
with politicians and government through providing a stable economy, and how 
firms may benefit from these relations when they need to deal with government 
officials. It is expected that firms benefitting from lowered costs of business and a 
less competitive environment will transform these advantages into opportunities 
for growth and investment. On one hand, firms with strong government relations 
do benefit from those advantages. On the other hand, however, these relations do 
not come for free and firms need to pay certain costs to build and maintain these 
relations. In the first hypothesis, I considered tax compliance and excessive hiring 
costs for building and maintain government relations. Paying more tax means that 
firms are left with less profit, and hiring more redundant employees means that 
firms are more inefficient and the payroll is relatively high compared to firms’ sales. 
As a result, building business-government relations through contributing to 
national economies could result in firms making less profit and thus having less 
money left to put into innovation and reinvestment.  
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Having strong government relations means that firms are capable of 
influencing policies and regulations in their industry and the regions that they 
operate in, so they can create a relatively less competitive environment and the 
approaching monopoly environment usually hinders motivation in investing in 
innovation. Moreover, the relations built are usually location and industry-specific 
as firms’ contributions to the economy are mainly observed by politicians and 
bureaucrats who are working in that specific geographical and industrial area. 
When firms move outside their attached geographical and industrial areas, the 
benefits they can get from the relations built diminish or even disappear. Thus 
firms with established relationships with politicians and bureaucrats have less 
incentive and motivation to innovate or diversify than other firms without such 
relations. Therefore, I argue that firms with strong government relations are less 
likely to alter their production lines and production plants. 
 
H3: Firms with stronger business-government relations are less 
likely to restructure their production mix.  
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CHAPTER 4 METHODS 
 
4.1 Data and Sample 
 
To test the costs and benefits of business-government relations and further 
analyze its impact on firm development, I use data from World Bank’s Enterprise 
Surveys (WorldBank, 2002b). The Enterprise Surveys consist of data from over 
120,000 manufacturing and service providing firms in 125 developing countries. 
The dataset has been used in other research, such as in entrepreneurship (e.g. 
Muravyev, Talavera, & Schafer, 2009) and in corruption (e.g. Kenny & Soreide, 
2008). As business-government relations are still a sensitive topic in many countries 
especially when there are questions about bribes and gifts that firms give to 
government officials, not all participating firms reveal their information on this 
topic. The survey used, however, attempts to solve this problem by asking sensitive 
questions indirectly. Questions concerning sensitive activities require respondents 
to comment on a hypothetical similar firm rather than admitting that the firms 
have engaged in these activities.  
Although the World Bank Group conducts the Enterprise Surveys (WEBS) 
every three years since 2002, in 2006 it changed the questionnaire dramatically so 
that some constructs of interest in this study are omitted. Thus I can only use 
survey data from 2002 to 2006. This paper focuses on transition economies. The 
empirical analysis includes all the 25 transition economies surveyed by WEBS: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, 
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Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. After dropping observations with 
meaningless values and missing key independent variables, there are 5,094 
observations from 25 industries.  
To increase data quality, WEBS was conducted through face-to-face 
interviews with company managers and owners. However, as some questions in 
the surveys like bribery activities, ability to affect government policies, and 
investment activities of firms are sensitive questions, the number of firms that 
responded to all these sensitive questions was smaller than the number of 
respondents. I conducted a standard mean comparison test to assess the non-
response bias and found that non-response bias happens across countries but not 
within countries. Thus, the inclusion of a country dummy variable can potentially 
solve the problem. I also used logistic regression models to control for baseline 
information to estimate the probability of response for each dependent variable. 
The reciprocals of these probabilities are used as non-responding weights in the 
empirical analysis. 
 
4.2 Variables and Measures 
In the first stage analysis, I study the relationship between firms’ 
involvement in maintaining a stable economy and strength of business-government 
relations. The dependent variable, business-government relations, measures firm-
21 
 
level relations with incumbent politicians and bureaucrats. Firms with better 
relationships with incumbent politicians and bureaucrats are more likely to 
influence government policies and regulations. Thus, the influential power of firms 
towards changes in laws and regulations is a good proxy for business-government 
relations. In the survey, there is a question asking respondents about the perceived 
influence on changes in laws and regulations that the focal firm has. The question is 
“How much influence do you think the following groups actually had on recently 
enacted national laws and regulations that have a substantial impact on your 
business?” Respondents could choose from 0 (No impact) to 4 (Decisive impact). 
Besides asking about the influence of (a) the focal firm, the question also asked 
about perceived influence of (b) other domestic firms, (c) dominant firms or 
conglomerates in key sectors of the economy, (d) individuals or firms with close 
personal ties to political leaders, and (e) foreign firms. Firms’ perceptions of 
influence are potentially affected by differential item functioning (DIF) such that 
identical firms may have unequal probabilities in answering questions about their 
own influence on government regulations and policies in the same way (Embretson, 
& Reise, 2000). The responses of the perceived influence questions show that the 
item has a high possibility of DIF as most firms responded that no one has any 
influential power and that the perceived own influence is associated with ratings of 
other firm categories. To account for the possibility of DIF, we used other firms’ 
influential power perceived by the focal firm as a reference. To reduce the effect of 
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bias towards any firm category, I used the average of four firm categories (b) to (e) 
as the reference. The perceived influence score is calculated as follows: 
                                     
       
 
  
The main independent variables for the first stage analysis are the costs 
that firms need to pay to build business-government relations. This set of 
independent variables includes tax compliance and excess employees that a firm 
hires.  
Tax compliance is the percentage of annual sales reported for tax purposes. 
It is captured by the question “Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises face in 
fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of total sales would 
you estimate the typical establishment in your area of activity reports for tax 
purposes?” This variable measures the level of strategic accounting. The less 
strategic accounting the focal firm performs, the more tax a firm needs to pay, and 
value of the tax compliance variable increases. This variable is predicted to have a 
positive association with perceived influence, i.e. the more tax a firm pays, the 
more influential a firm is. 
Excessive hiring is the percentage of excess employees that a firm has 
compared to its perceived optimal size. The measure is derived from 100% minus 
the answer to the question “If you could change the number of regular full-time 
workers you currently employ without any restrictions (i.e. without seeking 
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permission, making severance payments, etc.), what would be your optimal level of 
employment as a percent of your existing workforce?” I used a dummy variable, i.e. 
whether a firm hires non-necessary employees, and natural log of the excess 
percentage for empirical analysis. The excessive hiring variables are predicted to 
have positive associations with perceived influence. Firms which hire excess (non-
necessary) employees are more influential than firms which do not hire more than 
the amount they need, and the more non-necessary staff hired, the more 
influential a firm is. 
In the second stage, business-government relations are used as the key 
independent variable instead to investigate the benefits from building relationships 
with incumbent politicians and bureaucrats, and to study the impact of 
government relations on firm behavior and development. 
In this stage, there are two sets of dependent variables. The first set of 
dependent variables measures costs in dealing with government officials. This set 
of variables includes the bribes that firms pay to government officials to “get things 
done”, bribes that firms pay to secure government contracts, and efficiency of 
senior management dealing with government administrative paper work and 
procedures.  
Bribery is captured as a percentage to annual sales to the question “We’ve 
heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal 
payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
24 
 
licenses, regulations, services, etc. On average, what percent of annual sales value 
would such expenses cost a typical firm like yours?”  
Contract bribery is captured as a percentage of contract value to the 
question “When establishments in your industry do business with the government, 
how much of the contract value is typically expected in gifts or informal payments 
to secure the contract?”  
Efficiency is captured as a negative value of a percentage of time in a week 
to the question “In a typical week, what percentage of senior management's time is 
spent on dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations [e.g. taxes, 
customs, labor regulations, licensing and registration] including dealings with 
officials, completing forms, etc.?”  
Firms with stronger business-government relations are expected to have 
lower operational costs. Thus, coefficient signs of key independent variables in 
relation to bribery and contract bribery are expected to be negative and the 
coefficient sign of efficiency is expected to be positive, i.e. stronger relations 
reduce the bribes that need to be paid and the company is more efficient in 
administrative work. 
The second set of dependent variables measures the consequences of 
having business-government relations. This set of variables includes: started new 
production line, closed obsolete production line, opened new plant and closed old 
plant. The question asks whether the firms were involved in these activities in the 
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past three years. Firms with strong government relations on one hand benefit from 
paying less bribes, but on the other hand they need to pay more tax and hire 
excessive numbers of employees thereby becoming inefficient with less money to 
reinvest. Firms having strong government relations can operate in less competitive 
environments through influencing policy-making officials to create a more 
favorable business environment for the firms and the relations built are usually 
location and industry-specific as firms’ contributions to the economy are mainly 
observed by high-level officials who are working in that specific geographical and 
industrial area; thus these firms have less incentive and motivation to innovate or 
diversify than other firms in a more competitive environment. Thus, coefficient 
signs of the key independent variables are predicted to be negative. 
In both stages, I control for other factors that may influence the dependent 
variables, including firm age, firm size, two ownership dummy variables – foreign 
dominant ownership and government dominant ownership since firms owned by 
foreign shareholders and government tend to be more influential in relation to 
business-related policies, industry controls, country controls and year controls. As 
total asset of a firm was not available from the survey, firm size is measured in 
logarithms of the number of employees. 
 




I test the hypotheses using pooled OLS for most analysis and a pooled logit 
model for dummy independent variable, R&D involvement. Although the survey is 
conducted in different years and it is highly possible that some firms have more 
than one record in the dataset, the dataset does not provide a firm identifier which 
is required for longitudinal analysis. An OLS model is used to analyze the 
relationship between level of political contribution, in terms of excessive hiring and 
tax compliance, and business-government relations.  
                              
                                                
                                           
           
                                               
                                               
                        
Political Contribution: Tax compliance, Excessive Labor dummy, Excessive 
Labor (in percentage) 
Simple OLS and logistic models are used to analyze the benefits that firms 
can get from business-government relations when dealing with government 
officials and impact of business-government relations on firm behavior. The general 
model specification is as follows: 
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   : Bribe, Contact Bribe, Efficiency (OLS model) 
   : Started new production line, Closed obsolete production line, Opened 
new plant, Closed old plant (logit model) 
The coefficient of interest is   . All analyses are regressed on a country-




CHAPTER 5 RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
 
Table 2 summarizes the statistics of the variables and table 3 presents the 
correlation matrix. Table 3 shows that business-government relations are positively 
correlated with tax compliance and excessive labor, and negatively correlated with 
total bribes, bribes paid for government contracts, efficiency, and operational 
restructuring. While the two variables capturing bribes, total bribes and bribes paid 
for government contracts are generally expected to be highly correlated since they 
are used to capture the same underlying firm behavior, i.e. bribery, the actual data 
show the contrary.  This is because bribes paid to secure government contracts is 
associated with the industry which the focal firm is in, while the value of total 
bribes is not. In some industries, most firms do not involve themselves in 
government-related contracts and thus do not need to pay any bribes; however 
they still need to pay bribes to help their operations run smoothly. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here 
--------------------------------- 
 
5.1 Providing Support to Policy-Making Politicians 
Politicians rely on firms to provide a stable economy so that they can enjoy 
longer tenure. In return, politicians make and change policies and regulations 
according to these firms’ interests. H1 predicts that firms devote more resources to 
maintaining a stable economy are more likely to have stronger business-
government relations. Table 4 shows the estimations of this hypothesis. Columns (1) 
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and (2) show that firms reporting more tax have stronger business-government 
relations. The result is statistically significant; the magnitude of the result, however, 
is small. Columns (3) and (4) test whether having excessive labor helps firms to 
secure business-government relations and the result is positive. Columns (7) and (8) 
show that, although the excessive labor variable has the corrected predicted sign, it 
is not statistically significant. There are two plausible explanations. The first is that 
firms with more excessive labor are more likely to have higher numbers of 
employees, i.e. the effect of excessive labor may overlap with that of firm size. The 
second reason is that there are two groups of firms in the sample and they behave 
differently and cancel each other’s effect. Thus, I separate the sample into state-
owned firms and private firms and re-estimate the excessive labor models. The 
results (columns 5 and 9) show that having excessive labor does not affect 
business-government relations of state-owned firms. For private firms (columns 6 
and 10), having excessive labor does strengthen their relations with the 
government, and the more excessive labor they have, the stronger the relation is 
and the more able the firms are to influence government policies and regulations 
that they are interested in. Such results provide further evidence that contributions 
to reducing the unemployment rate help private firms to build and sustain relations 
with policy-making politicians and bureaucrats. Therefore, H1 is supported. 
--------------------------------- 






5.2 Dealing with Operating Government Officials 
 
H2 predicts that business-government relations help firms to deal with 
government officials easily and, in turn, reduces firms’ operational costs. I analyze 
the relationship of business-government relations with three types of costs: bribery 
paid to “get things done”, bribery paid to secure government contracts and time 
spent on dealing with government officials and procedures with administrative 
works. The results are shown in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) show the relationship 
between business-government relations and estimated bribes paid to government 
officials. I find that firms are more influential over law and regulations, i.e. have 
stronger business-government relations and pay less bribes to “get things done”. 
Columns (3) and (4) show that firms with stronger business-government relations 
pay less to secure government contracts. From columns (5) and (6), senior 
management from firms with strong business-government relations spend less 
time on dealing with government officials and procedures with administrative 
works; the result, however, is not statistically significant. Thus we can conclude 
that firms with strong government relations benefit from lower operational costs 
by paying less bribes while there is no guarantee that they can enjoy more efficient 
service from government officials. Thus, H2 is only partially supported.  
--------------------------------- 






5.3 Impact on Firm Behavior 
 
After looking at the costs of and benefits from building business-
government relations, let’s turn to how these government relations influence firm 
behavior. Table 6 shows the analyses of consequences of business-government 
relations in terms of production mix (production lines and production plants) 
restructuring. Firms with stronger relations with government are less likely to 
introduce or shut down production lines, and they are less likely to open new 
production plants. Although the relationship between business-government 
relations and closing production plants has the correct sign, the result is not 
statistically significant. H3 is partially supported. 
--------------------------------- 





CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Discussion 
This paper presents the costs of and benefits from building business-
government relations and analyzes the consequence of business-government 
relations on firms’ further development in the context of transition economies. 
Although business-government relations are a form of benefit exchange, previous 
studies mostly focus on the benefit side of firms, while comparatively few studies 
look into the costs that firms need to pay for such exchange and the consequence 
of paying such costs in the long run.  
Empirical results show that in transition economies, firms putting more 
resources into providing a stable economy and helping politicians to stay in their 
positions for a little longer, have stronger relations with the government and are 
more capable of influencing policies and regulations that are related to their 
business. The results also show that in transition economies business-government 
relations can help firms to deal with government officials since having strong 
relations with policy-making politicians can deter rent-seeking behavior of 
government officials and ensure that they provide an efficient service. Firms with 
strong business-government relations in transition economies are less likely to 
innovate or restructure their production mix although such relations reduce their 
operational costs and increase their efficiency. There are several possible reasons 
for this firm behavior. First, there are costs in building relations; second, the ability 
to influence policies and regulations may create a less competitive environment for 
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the firm; and finally, business-government relations of this type are geographical 
and industrial-specific. For all these reasons, firms with strong relations with high-
level government officials have less motivation in innovation and reinvestment. 
Further research can explore this subject matter deeper and attempt to find out 
the underlying reasons for this behavior. 
Some may argue that these firms do not invest in innovation and 
reinvestment simply because it is unnecessary as their influential power over high-
level government officials provides them a good business environment to operate 
in and these firms are doing fairly well. However, firms which underinvest in 
innovation and reinvestment in the long run may become rigid in operations and 
will be less capable of dealing with sudden market or political environment changes. 
The paper also has important managerial implications.  It has been widely 
accepted and believed that business-government relations can help firms to access 
resources, get things done easier and even help improve performance. However, 
managers may not be aware that the benefits from business-government relations 
come with a cost that is so high that it would affect a firm’s investment decision-
making and hinder future development. Thus, when building and maintaining 
business-government relations, managers should ensure that they can balance the 
costs and benefits so as to maintain reasonable future development. 
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6.2 Limitations and Further Studies 
This study suffers a number of limitations and awaits refinements in further 
study. This paper has its merits in that it presents an empirical test for some 
government relation building costs that are understudied by business scholars and 
the potential long-term effects of business-government relations on firm behavior, 
but the cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow the conclusion of a causal 
relationship. Furthermore, the lack of a firm identifier in the dataset results in 
multiple observations of some firms in different years. Further study needs to 
collect longitudinal data to explore the causal relationship between high-level and 
low-level business-government relations and use a firm identifier to control for 
unobserved firm effects in panel data analyses.  
Since information about bribery is sensitive, survey questions of this type 
sometimes are ignored by respondents and the validity of the data is usually 
questioned even though respondents provide answers. Although the Enterprise 
Surveys asks sensitive questions in an indirect way such that respondents do not 
admit that they engage in these sensitive issues and this method potentially 
increases item response rate and validity, further study should explore other 
possible research methods or survey designs, e.g. the Unmatched Count Technique 
(Ahart & Sackeet 2004; Couts & Jann, 2009), that can further enhance item 
response rate and evaluate item validity. 
Despite the fundamental differences between high and low-level 
government officials, management and business strategy scholars seldom 
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distinguish the two when they are studying business-government relations.  
Economic, financial, social science, political science fields and some business ethics 
studies do indeed distinguish between the types of corruption committed by these 
two types of government official respectively (e.g. Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Rose-
Ackerman, 2002; Wilson & Damania, 2005). In these corruption studies, the term 
“grand corruption” refers to large-scale transactions that involve high-level 
politicians and the term “petty corruption” refers to corruption cases involving 
smaller sums and typically more junior officials. These studies, however, did not go 
further in exploring how business-government relations with high-level and low-
level government officials are inter-related. In the development of H2, I present 
different reasons for how business-government relations help firms to deter rent-
seeking behavior from high-level and low-level government officials respectively. 
Due to the limitation of the data used in this study, it is not possible to test 
whether and how business-government relations with high-level and low-level 
government officials are inter-related. With the available data, further study on this 
area should be encouraged as better knowledge of such interrelations can help 
firms to balance their costs when dealing with government officials. 
The results of this study provide momentum for understanding the 
consequences of business-government relations and its effect on firms’ long-term 
development. Future research can incorporate country-level institutional variables, 
e.g. the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) (Bertelsmann-Foundation, 
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2012), into the analysis to determine how the progress in economy transition 
influences business-government relations in different stages. 
6.3 Conclusion 
To conclude, this paper explores indirect costs for firms in building good 
relations with policy-making politicians and studies how these relations help firms 
when dealing with policy implementing government officials. It also goes a step 
further to better understand the influence of business-government relations on 
firm decision-making and firm development. Future studies can build on these 
ideas and go deeper into discovering more firm decisions or behavior that are 
influenced by business-government relations and come to a better conclusion on 
how business-government relations impact firms in the long run. Moreover, studies 
on how firms’ relations with high-level and low-level government officials are 
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Table 1: List of Transition Economies 
Transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union 
  CEE Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
  
 
Baltics    Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
  
 
CIS Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
  
  
Transition economies in Asia 
  Cambodia, China, Laos, Vietnam 
Source: IMF (2000) Transition Economies: An IMF Perspective on Progress and Prospects  
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Gov. Relation 5094 -0.977  1.205  -4 4 
Firm age (years) 5094 25.189  19.470  10 212 
Firm Size (Permanent workers ln, t-1) 5072 3.281  1.743  0 10.363  
Foreign Firm 5094 0.067  0.251  0 1 
State-owned firm 5094 0.128  0.334  0 1 
Tax compliance (% of sales reported) 4567 83.398  24.452  1 100 
Excess labor 4950 0.264  0.441  0 1 
% Excess labor (ln) 4950 5.032  12.295  0 100 
Total bribes (% sales) 4647 1.693  3.728  0 70 
Bribes for Gov. contracts (% of value) 4522 1.783  4.579  0 50 
Efficiency 4853 8.406  12.406  0 90 
Opened new product line in past 3 years 5071 0.396  0.489  0 1 
Closed obsolete product line in past 3 years 5066 0.222  0.416  0 1 
Opened new production plant in past 3 years 5066 0.146  0.354  0 1 
Closed old plant in past 3 years 5062 0.119  0.324  0 1 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Gov. Relation 1 1 
              Firm age (years) 2 0.0739 1 
             Firm Size (Permanent workers ln, t-1) 3 0.1140 0.3873 1 
            Foreign Firm 4 0.1167 0.3947 0.9651 1 
           State-owned firm 5 0.0003 0.0418 0.1394 0.1297 1 
          Tax compliance (% of sales reported) 6 0.1395 0.3792 0.2932 0.2987 -0.1077 1 
         Excess labor 7 0.0244 0.1027 0.1396 0.1380 0.0182 0.1022 1 
        % Excess labor (ln) 8 0.0674 0.1742 0.2799 0.2737 0.0425 0.1245 0.0378 1 
       Total bribes (% sales) 9 0.0564 0.1665 0.2487 0.2467 0.0359 0.1216 0.0334 0.9660 1 
      Bribes for Gov. contracts (% of value) 10 -0.0802 -0.0860 -0.1007 -0.1093 -0.0125 -0.119 -0.2061 -0.0285 -0.0146 1 
     Efficiency 11 -0.106 -0.0709 -0.0638 -0.0747 -0.0095 -0.0757 -0.1472 -0.0230 -0.0127 0.3241 1 
    Opened new product line in past 3 years 12 -0.0452 0.0191 0.0409 0.0319 0.0269 0.0113 -0.0774 0.0322 0.0325 0.1425 0.1165 1 
   Closed obsolete product line in past 3 years 13 -0.0365 0.0407 0.1812 0.1575 0.0146 -0.0105 -0.0190 0.0171 0.0122 0.0306 0.0487 0.0481 1 
  Opened new production plant in past 3 years 14 -0.0571 0.0453 0.1421 0.1269 0.0309 0.002 -0.0317 0.0489 0.0403 0.0236 0.0434 0.0507 0.2665 1 
 Closed old plant in past 3 years 15 -0.0609 -0.0275 0.1577 0.1489 0.0400 -0.0349 0.0045 0.0306 0.0188 0.0141 0.0267 0.0133 0.2204 0.1339 1 
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Table 4: Tax Compliance, Excess Labor and Business-Government Relations 
 
Gov. Relation (Perceived Influence) 
All All All All State-Owned Private All All State-Owned Private 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Tax compliance 0.002** 0.002**       
  
 
(0.001) (0.001)       
  
Excessive Labor    0.081* 0.072* -0.086 0.095**     
(Dummy)   (0.043) (0.042) (0.113) (0.044)   
  
Excessive Labor        0.022 0.019 -0.028 0.029* 
(ln, %)       (0.016) (0.016) (0.041) (0.017) 
Age 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 0.002* 0.001 0.003* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.003* 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.280) (0.078) 
Size -0.011 -0.009 -0.037 -0.034 -0.058 -0.017 -0.035 -0.033 -0.062 -0.015 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.137) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.136) (0.041) 
Size2 0.009 0.008 0.011* 0.010* 0.019 0.007 0.010* 0.010* 0.020 0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) 
Foreign -0.010 -0.012 0.012 0.007  -0.001 0.012 0.007  0.001 
 
(0.072) (0.071) (0.069) (0.068)  (0.068) (0.069) (0.068)  (0.069) 
State-Owned 0.212*** 0.202*** 0.229*** 0.220***   0.229*** 0.219***   
 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.060) (0.060)   (0.060) (0.060)   
Constant -0.692*** -1.667*** -0.455** -1.131*** -0.946 -1.253*** -0.461** -1.136*** -0.945 -1.260*** 
 
(0.209) (0.219) (0.206) (0.215) (0.684) (0.217) (0.206) (0.215) (0.687) (0.216) 
Non-response 
weighting No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
N 4269 4269 4630 4630 624 4006 4630 4630 624 4006 
k 426 426 429 429 238 411 429 429 238 411 
R2 0.158 0.159 0.147 0.147 0.177 0.142 0.147 0.147 0.177 0.141 
RMSE 1.109 1.105 1.113 1.101 1.223 1.090 1.114 1.110 1.223 1.091 
Notes: Results from OLS regressions, with industry, country and year dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors clustered by k country-industry clusters are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.10 
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Table 5: Business-Government Relation and Costs in Dealing with Government Officials 
 
Bribe 
(% of sales) 
Contract Bribe 
(% of contract value) 
Efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gov. Relation -0.214*** -0.215*** -0.356*** -0.36*** -0.112 -0.119 
 
(0.046) (0.048) (0.065) (0.068) (0.168) (0.178) 
Age -0.001 -0.002 -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.012) 
Size -0.098 -0.056 0.231 0.227 0.774 0.663 
 
(0.103) (0.105) (0.152) (0.164) (0.472) (0.506) 
Size2 -0.01 -0.014 -0.044 -0.044** -0.079 -0.067 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.059) (0.064) 
Foreign -0.160 -0.177 0.101 0.108 1.189 1.373 
 
(0.166) (0.171) (0.274) (0.283) (0.815) (0.851) 
State-Owned -1.063*** -1.087*** -0.762*** -0.741*** 0.288 0.300 
 
(0.134) (0.139) (0.227) (0.230) (0.568) (0.590) 
Constant 3.148*** 1.22*** 1.626** 1.812** 5.143** 11.742*** 
 
(0.717) (0.404) (0.692) (0.732) 2.175 2.483 
Non-response 
weighting No Yes No  Yes No Yes 
N 4405 4092 4366 4053 4524 4211 
k 421 382 425 386 352 313 
R2 0.089 0.089 0.069 0.069 0.064 0.064 
RMSE 3.210 3.199 4.460 4.502 11.562 11.691 
Notes: Results from OLS regressions, with industry, country and year dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors clustered by k 










Opened new plant Closed old plant 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gov. Relation -0.100** -0.274*** -0.139** -0.133 
 
(0.043) (0.053) (0.071) (0.083) 
Age -0.007** 0.003 -0.014** 0.013*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Size 0.561*** 0.394*** 0.755*** 0.426** 
 
(0.121) (0.14) (0.226) (0.188) 
Size2 -0.044 -0.022 -0.051* -0.028 
 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.027) (0.023) 
Foreign -0.321 -0.291 -0.118 0.082 
 
(0.220) (0.232) (0.316) (0.344) 
State-Owned -0.322** -0.048 -0.487 -0.484* 
 
(0.151) (0.187) (0.307) (0.252) 
Constant -0.541 -1.286*** -5.010*** -2.584*** 
 
(0.340) (0.440) (0.857) (0.513) 
N 2284 2243 1969 1965 
k 203 191 145 145 
R2 0.094    0.102 0.132 0.077 
Notes: Results from logistic regressions, with industry, country and year dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors clustered 
by k country-industry clusters are in parentheses. R2 values reported are pseudo R2. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
 
